Merckel: The Direct Broadcast Satellite

THE DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITE: THE
NEED FOR EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL
REGULATION
I.

INTRODUCTION

The direct broadcast satellite, 1 like most valuable resources, is both
economically scarce and vitally needed by all countries. 2 There is a need
for such satellites in the fully developed countries in order to facilitate
the efficient exchange of an entire spectrum of information: from politics to cultural advancement. At the same time there is a pressing need
for such satellites in the developing countries, such as India, 3 if the
stated social and political goals of their governments are to be achieved.
Concomitant with the potential benefits to be derived from such satellites, however, there arise serious possibilities for abuse. The areas in
which there is great potential for abuse include broadcast intervention, 4
cultural imperialism, propaganda, spill-over, 5 frequency allocation, and
1. There are three types of communication satellites: passive, active, and direct
broadcast.
Passive satellites rettect a signal transmitted from one earth station to another earth
station. This type of satellite requires the use of extremely powerful transmitters and
complex, sensitive receivers, both of which are exceedingly expensive.
Active satellites amplify the signals received before transmitting them to a ground
station. The higher cost of the satellite is balanced by the relatively low cost for the
transmitting and receiving apparatus.
Direct broadcast satellites are hybrid active satellites which have a synchronous orbit.
The direc~ broadcast satellite not only has the ability to amplify signals it receives from
an earth station, but also possesses the capacity to transmit audio and visual signals
directly into an individual's television set. A synchronous orbit is a circular orbit around
the earth in the plane of the equator. The satellite's period of revolution is the same as
the earth's. This means that it will remain in a fixed position with respect to a point on
the earth and can, therefore, provide uninterrupted services from a particular ground
station to a large area of the earth. See Smith, The Legal Ordering of Satellite Telecommunications: Problems and Alternatives, 44 INDIANA L.J. 338 (1968-69) [hereinafter cited
as Smithj.
2. Gold , Direct Broadcast Satellites: Implications for Less Developed Countries and
for World Order, 12 VA. J. INT'L L. 66 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Gold].
:i. Conditions in India and other similar developing countries would seem to demand
such services as would be provided by direct broadcast satellites. India has large inaccessible areas, a high illiteracy rate and minimum communications facilities. The benefits to
be derived would primarily be educational and industrial. Id. at 67. Also note that the
United States will launch and position a direct broadcast satellite over India sometime
in 1974. The Department of Atomic Energy of India will operate the satellite. See Memorandum of Understandinu Between the Department of Atomic Energy of the Government
of India and th e United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration, U.N.
Doc. A/AC. 105/72 (1969), 8 INT'L LEG. MAT. 1281 (1969).
4. See notes 46 & 48 infra and accompanying text.
5. See note 87 infra .
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orbital slot allocation. 6 The abuse potential in these areas is of such a
magnitude that, if left unabated, they would prove to be insurmountable barriers to the full development of an international direct broadcast
satellite system.
Through the simultaneous creation of both benefit and abuse potential, the direct broadcast satellite has necessitated some form of
international regulation of its use. There are three major proposals
which have been suggested to achieve this end. These proposals are: (1)
Intelsat, the United States sponsored solution, 7 (2) the UNESCO Draft
Declaration on the use of satellite broadcasting, 8 and (3) the U.S.S.R.
Draft Convention on direct television broadcasting. 9 This article discusses the responsiveness of these proposals to the issues raised by direct
broadcast satellites.
However, it is essential that, from the outset, the reader appreciate
the nature of the problem with which the international lawyer and the
diplomat are faced as they attempt to regulate the use of direct broadcast satellites. Accordingly, it is appropriate, if not crucial, to begin the
study of what ought to be done to regulate direct broadcast satellites
with a brief sketch of what has been done and what currently comprises
the status quo regarding such regulatory attempts.
II. THE PROGRESS MADE BY THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY TOWARDS EFFECTIVE REGULATION OF
THE DIRECT BROADCAST SA TELL/TE

Currently, there is no unity of thought in the world as to either an
international set of guiding principles for the use of direct broadcast
satellite8 or the formation of a single global system of telecommunications. This observation is evidenced by the activities of numerous
agencies· and countries in the field of satellite communications.
One such agency is the International Telecommunications Union, 10
6. See note 77 infra and accompanying text.
7. Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), Aug. 20, 1971, [19721 23 U.S.T. 3813, T.I.A.S. No. 7532 (effective Feb.
12, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Intelsat]. Operating Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), Aug. 20, 1971, [1972] 23
U.S.T. 4091, T.I.A.S. No. 7532 (effective Feb. 12, 1973).
8. The UN ESCO Declaration of Guiding Principles on the Use of Satellite Broadcastin.i; fur the Free Fluw of Information, The Spread of Education and Greater Cultural
f,'xchan.i;e, ll.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/104 (1972), 11 INT'L LEG. MAT. 1476 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as UNK'iCOI.
9. The U.S.S . R. Draft Convention on Principles Governing the Use by States of
Artificial f,'arth Satellites for Direct Television Broadcasting, U.N. Doc. A/8771 (1972),
11 lNT'r. LEG. MAT. 1;n5 (1972) [hereinafter cited as U.S.S.R.J
10. Since 1947, the I.T.U. has been a specialized agency of the United Nations. The
basic instrument of the I.T. U. is the International Telecommunications Convention, the
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whose main function is the allocation of electromagnetic frequencies"
for specific types of use. 12 In 1959 the I.T.U. first revised its regulations
in order to allocate frequencies to radio communication services for
space research purposes. 13 Later, in 1963, I.T. U. once again revised its
regulations and for the first time allocated frequency bands specifically
to communication satellites. 14 Finally, in 1971, at the World Administrative Conference for Space Telecommunications, 15 specific problems arising from the use of direct broadcast satellites were discussed. The results
of those discussions were refinements of I.T.U.'s specialized operations
in the areas_of radio frequency spectrum utilization and allocation. 16
Another international agency that has been active in the area of
direct broadcast satellites is the United Nations Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. 17 One of the Committee's three working
groups is the Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites, which, to
date, has submitted four reports concerning direct broadcast satellites.
In the first of these reports it was noted that the use of direct broadcast
satellites on an operational basis was not likely until after 1985: 18 However, in its second report in 1969, 19 the Working Group concluded that
current version of which entered into force Jan. 1, 1967. See International Telecommunications Convention, May 29, 1967 [1967] 18 U.S .T. 575, T.l.A.S. No. 6267. According to
some authors , the I.T.U. has, and may continue to play the leading role in the allocation
of electromagnetic frequencies .
11. S. LAY & H . TAUBENFELD, THE LAW RELATING TO ACTIVITIES OF MAN IN SPACE 114
( 1970) I hereinafter cited as S. LAY & H. TAUBENFELD].
12. Id. Basically, the I.T.U. allocates bands of frequencies for types of use rather than
to specific users. Once a frequency band has been assigned for a use such as satellite
communications, the various nations then assign specific frequencies to their own stations.
These a ssigned frequencies are then registered with the International Frequency Registration Board of I.T.U. on a first come first serve basis.
rn . The revis ions were accomplished at the 1959 Administrative Radio Conference,
held in Geneva. See U.N. Doc . A/AC. 105/100 48, para. 186(i) (1959).
14. The specific revisions concerning communication satellites were enacted at the
Extra Ordinary Administrative Radio Conference to Allocate Frequency Bands for Space
Radio Purposes, held at Geneva in 1963. See Final Acts of the Extra Ordinary Administrative Radio Conference to Allocate Frequency Bands for Space Radio Communication
Purposes, Nov. 1963, I 19641 15 U.S.T. 887, T.l.A.S. No. 5603. A major accomplishment
of the 196:3 Conference was the increasing of the percentage of the radio frequency spectrum allocated to outer space activities. At the 1959 Conference (supra note 13) only 1%
had been allocated , but at the 1963 Conference that was increased to 15%. See Smith,
supra note 1, at :356.
l S. S ee note 13 supra , at 50, para . 199.
16. A rather detailed overview of the results, which deals basically with the problems
of technical allocation of frequencies to broadcast satellites and earth exploration satellites , is available in id. at 51-60.
17. The Committee's twenty -eight member countries include the United States and
the U.S.S.R. Id. at :3.
18. For a summary of the Working Group's report see id. at 10.
19. For s ummary of the Working Group's second report see id. at 10, para. 36. Also
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there was then a present need to consider the social, cultural and legal
implications of such a satellite system. Of particular importance was the
Working Group's conclusion that there was no international institution
which had the competence to take action in all the fields of direct
broadcasting. Therefore, the Working Group recommended that the
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space should
sustain the interest that it had shown in coordinating activity in the
field of direct broadcasting. 20 In a subsequent report, issued in 1970, the
Working Group noted that there were several legal questions raised by
the use of direct broadcast satellites and that they were considering the
possibility of establishing a set of guiding principles on the subject. 21
There were no indications in that report, however, that such a set of
general principles had been established. 22
It was not until November 1972 that the Working Group was reconvened under the authority of a United Nations General Assembly resolution23 with instructions that it study new material that had become
available since its last meeting. Among this new material was the
UNESCO Draft Declaration, 24 which was one of the few attempts made
to establish an international set of guiding principles for the use of direct
broadcast satellites.
The result of this resolution was still another General Assembly
resolution, entitled Preparation of an International Convention on Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for
Direct Television Broadcasting. 25 The importance of this resolution was
three-fold: (1) the United Nations officially recognized the pressing need
to prevent the conversion of direct television broadcasting into a source
of international conflict and the need to protect the sovereignty of states
from external interference; (2) the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
note that this report came out only a few months prior to the India-United States agreement. See note 3 supra.
20. It is interesting to note that at the time of the Working Group's second report
Intelsat was in existence. So, in effect, the report was a pronouncement by the Working
Group that Intelsat itself was not competent to regulate the use of direct broadcast
satellites under its structure at that time. It will be shown later in this article that at
present, Intelsat is still not completely competent to handle the issues raised by direct
broadcast satellites.
21. See note 13 supra at 10, paras. 37 & 38.
22. This conclusion is arrived at when one notes that the Working Group, after
issuing their third report in 1970, was not reconvened until November 1972. The reason
for the Working Group not being reconvened earlier, in order to work on the establishment
of a set of guiding principles, is that the Working Group itself felt that there were not
enough materials available for it to act upon.
2:1. See G.A. RES. 2915, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at paras. 18, 19 & 23, U.N. Doc.
N8730 0972).
24. See UNESCO, supra note 8.
25. See G.A. Res. 2916, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, U.N. Doc. N8730 (1972).
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Outer Space was requested to undertake the elaboration of such principles and to consider the U.S.S.R. Draft Convention 26 on direct television
broadcasting as a possible model; and (3) the General Assembly resolution was voted against by only one country, the United States. 27
Analysis of the factors involved in the U.S. decision suggest that the
rationale was twofold, but that both aspects of the controlling policy
stemmed from the same key consideration, Intelsat. The first of these
aspects is that the United States was heavily committed financially to
the Intelsat consortium, 28 which operates independently of the United
Nations. The second reason was possibly a fear that whatever principles
were established would conflict with the operating policies of Intelsat.
At present the establishment of an international convention is still
under active consideration. Despite the United Nations recognition of
the need for one, however, there are no indications of any rapid developments that would lead to the establishment of such an international
convention. 29
A third international agency involved in the area of regulating direct broadcast satellites in addition to standard communication satellites, is the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium
(Intelsat). Intelsat is an organization whose member countries together
own and operate the global commercial communications satellite system. 30 The member nations of Intelsat are responsible for a very high
percentage, perhaps in excess of ninety percent, of all the telecommunication traffic in the world. 31 Intelsat was originally established in 1964
under two international interim agreements. 32 Two years later a third
26. See U.S.S.R., supra note 9.
27. The resolution was approved by a vote of 102 in favor to 1 against (United States),
with 7 abstentions. 11 INT'L LEG. MAT. 1470 (1972).
28 . See note 38 infra and accompanying text.
29. The present state of affairs is demonstrated by the Working Group on Direct
Broadcast Satellites' 1973 Report. In its report, the Working Group stated that it was
aware of the need for a set of guiding principles on the use of direct broadcast satellites
and would continue to give the matter its full attention. See U.N. Doc. NAC. 105/117
(1973).
For further reports dealing with the United Nation's discussions on international
principles governing the use of direct broadcast satellites see G.A. Res. 2917, 27 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 30, U.N. Doc. N8730 (1972) on the preparation of arrangements on principles governing the use of artificial earth satellites. See also The Report of the Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/8720 (1972), which has scheduled
another meeting of the Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites for March, 1974.
ao. See note 13 supra, at 131, para. 555.
:n. See S. LAY & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 11, at 124. Also note that the U.S.S.R.
is not a member of Intelsat, although the Republic of China is. 10 INT'L LEG. MAT. 909
(1971).
:32. The Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial
Communication Satellite System, August 20, 1964, (1964] 15 U.S.T. 1705, T.l.A.S. No.
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international agreement was incorporated which provided for the settlement of disputes among Members through a process of arbitration. 33 At
present Intelsat is governed by the new Definitive Agreements, which
entered into force January 1, 1973. 34 The Definitive Agreements entirely
replace the 1964 interim agreements.
Under the present Intelsat documents, the purpose of Intelsat is
to achieve a single global commercial telecommunication satellite system as part of an improved global telecommunications network which
will provide expanded telecommunications services to all areas of the
world and which will contribute to world peace and understanding. 35

The operating structures used in attempting to achieve this goal are: An
Assembly of Parties, 36 Meeting of Signatories, 37 Board of Governors, 38
and a Director-General. 39 Voting participation at the Board of Governors
level, is based upon a percentage investment system. 40 The United
5646. Special Agreement, August 20, 1964, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 1745, T.1.A.S . No. 5646.
33. Supplementary Agreement on Arbitration, 4 INT'L LEG. MAT. 735 (1965).
34. See Intelsat, supra note 7.
35. Id. art. III for the scope of Intelsat activities.
36. Id. art. VII (Assembly of Parties).
a) The Assembly of Parties shall be composed of all the Parties and shall be the
principal organ of Intelsat.
c) The Assembly of Parties shall have the following functions and powers:
(iv) to authorize through general rules or by specific determinations,
the utilization of the Intelsat space segment . .. .
(v) to review, in order to ensure the application of the principle of nondiscrimination, the general rules established pursuant to subparagraph b(v) of Article VIII . . . .
37. Id. art . VIII (Meeting of Signatories).
a) Shall be composed of all the Signatories.
b) The Meeting of Signatories shall have the following functions and powers:
(v) . .. to establish general rules upon the recommendation of the
Board of Governors .
38. Id. art. IX (Board of Governors).
a) The Board of Governors shall be composed of:
1) one Governor representing each Signatory whose investment share
is not less than the minimum investment share as determined in
accordance with paragraph (b) . . . .
b) (i) . . . the minimum investment share that will entitle a Signatory or group
of Signatories to be represented on the Board of Governors shall be equal to the
investment share of the Signatory holding position thirteen .. ..
.See also, id. art. X.
a) !The Board of Governors! shall have the responsibility for the design development, construction, establishment, operation and maintenance of the Intelsat
Space segment .
:m. Id. art. XI.
40. Id. art. V.
b) Each signatory shall have an investment share corresponding to its percen-
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States participates as a Governor through its designated representative
COMSAT. 41 Under the 1964 Interim Agreements COMSAT had a voting
percentage of sixty percent as compared to 30.5 percent for European
Signatories, and 8.5 percent divided among Australia, Canada and
Japan. 42 However, under the new Definitive Agreements COMSAT's
voting percentage has been arbitrarily limited to forty percent. 43 Even
with the decrease in the United States control, the U.S.S.R. has opted
not to join Intelsat. Instead, it has established its own telecommunications satellite system. 44 At the present time, it is only being used
for domestic purposes but it has obvious international potential which
will probably bring it into conflict with Intelsat.
The Soviet Union is not the only other country trying to develop
international telecommunications capabilities. France, England, Germany, Japan and other nations have the ability individually or collectively to develop regional or global communication satellite systems. 45
It is against this diverse background that the Intelsat, UNESCO,
and U.S.S.R. solutions will be analyzed in terms of their responsiveness
to the various issues raised by the injection of the direct broadcast
satellite into any telecommunications system.
tage of all utilization of the Intelsat space segment by all Signatories .
Id. art. IX.
f) . . . each Governor shall have a voting participation equal to that part of the
investment share of the Signatory, or group of Signatories, he represents . . . .
41. COMSAT is a privately owned Communication Satellite Corporation that represents the U.S. in Intelsat. It was created under the Communication Satellite Act, P.L.
87-624, 47 U.S.C. §§ 701-44 (1962).
42. Smith supra note 1, at 347.
4:-L S ee Intelsat, supra note 7, art. IX para. g(iv):
No Governor may cast more than forty percent of the total voting participation
of all Signatories and groups of Signatories represented on the Board of Governors.
This provision was an attempt to calm the protests of many of the poorer nations who
feared a monopoly by the United States, and to compromise the U.S.S.R.'s criticism that
such a weighted voting procedure was incompatible with the principle of sovereign
equality. S ee Smith, supra note 1, at 349.
44. Intersputnik is an agreement on the establishment of Intersputnik, an international system of space communication via satellite; it was signed in Moscow on November
15, 1971 by: Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Cuba, Mongolia, Poland , Romania, U.S.S.R., and Czechoslovakia. The Agreement is open for accession by
all States of the world. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/100 137 (1959).
45. Among other countries or groups of countries which have considered the possibilities of national or regional communications satellites are Canada and a few Latin American countries. Some of the organizations involved are the European Conference of Postal
and Telecommunications Administration representing 23 European countries; Eurospace,
a private association of industrial firms and professional bodies from 12 European countries; the European Space Research Organization and many other organizations with
membership encompassing private and public sectors on both sides of the Atlantic and
Iron Curtain. S ee S. LAY & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 11, at 104 n.6.
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ISSUES AND PRESENTLY PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

Broadcast Intervention

Direct broadcast satellites open up the possibility of broadcast intervention by television similar to that presently achieved by radio. 46 As
a result, the leaders of many countries have expressed concern over the
fact that the United States or Russia, with as few as three direct broadcast satellites, could reach every television screen in the world. 47
Broadcast intervention can be divided into two closely related problems. The first of these is known as cultural imperialism, and is raised
by many countries which fear that certain types of programs from the
broadcasting country would tend to promote unwarranted and unneeded changes. There is also the fear that the programs could generate
strong desires for a different standard of living thereby creating tensions
within the receiving country that its, government would rather do without. 48 The second problem in the area of broadcast intervention, is that
the direct broadcast satellite could all too easily be used by the broadcasting country for propaganda purposes. 49
1.

INTELSAT

The issues presented above offer tremendous avenues of abuse and
therefore barriers to the full development of the benefits to be derived
from the use of direct broadcast satellites. However, nowhere in the
present Intelsat agreements does there appear to be a provision that
deals specifically with these issues. One can infer a sanction against
broadcast interventions for the purposes of cultural imperialism and
propaganda from Article III of the Definitive Agreement. There mention
is made of providing "telecommunication services of high quality
50
•••• "
Other provisions that offer the potential for development
of a set of rules governing the use of direct broadcast satellites are
46. See Gold, supra note 2, at 78. An example of radio broadcast intervention are the
many radio wars between the Soviet Union and China, the United States and the Soviet
Union, and Europe and the Soviet Union.
47. See Hearings Before the House Sub-Comm. on National Security Policy and
Scientific Development, 9lst Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1969).
48. Such countries as Canada have viewed with concern the great impact that United
States television has had or would have on Canadian culture, and as a result have restricted use of American programs in Canada. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1970, at 8, col. 1.
Iceland has also decided that its television audiences, despite their desires, should not
receive American programs at all. See Gold, supra note 2, at 76.
49. Due to its capability of transmitting directly into an individual's television set,
the potential for creating internal unrest, hatred, violence and general dissension is greatly
amplified.
50. See Intelstat, supra note 7, Article III, para. (a) seems to speak more to the
quality of the goods provided rather than the use that they are put to.
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those that (1) authorize the Assembly of Parties through general rules
to determine the utilization of the Intelsat space segment, 51 (2) authorize
the Meeting of Signatories to establish general rules concerning the
utilization of the Intelsat space segment, 52 and (3) authorize the Board
of Governors to adopt terms and conditions regarding the use of the
space segment owned and operated by Intelsat. 53
Despite these possibilities there has been no indication of the development of a set of guiding principles by which to govern the use of direct
broadcast satellites. Instead the provisions of the Intelsat agreements
remain directed to the administrative processes of organizing access to
the system and not to the uses to which the particular State would put
the communication satellite. The potential for abuse of the direct broadcast satellite, therefore, remains unabated.
Even though there are no provisions that specifically deal with the
issue of abuse of direct broadcast satellites, there are provisions that
refer to the settlement of disputes. 54 Despite the effectiveness of the
arbitration process in disputes between Parties or Signatories involving
communication satellites, it is inadequate to the task of regulating disputes arising from the abuse of a direct broadcast satellite and a nonMember country. This conclusion is based upon reading of Article
XVIII of the Operating Agreement, 55 in light of the following situations:
A Party nation of Intelsat, possessing an earth station, broadcasts programs containing propaganda into a non-Member nation via direct
broadcast satellites and that nation strongly resents the content of those

a

51. See Intelsat, supra note 7.
52. Id.
5:{ . · Id . art. X, para. a( vii).
IThe Board of Governors shall have the power to adopt] terms and conditions
governing the allotment of Intelsat space segment.
"Space segment" means the telecommunication satellites and the tracking, telemetry,
command, control, monitoring and related facilities and equipment required to support
the operation of these satellites. Id. at 910, art. I, para. (h).
54. Id. art. XVIII.
a) All legal disputes arising in connection with the rights and obligations under
this Agreement or in connection with obligations undertaken by Parties, between Parties with respect to each other or between INTELSAT and one or more
Parties , if not otherwise settled in a reasonable time, shall be submitted to
arbitration in accordance with the provisions of Annex C . . . . Any legal dispute arising in connection with the rights and obligations under this Agreement
or the Operating Agreement between one or more Parties and one or more
Signatories may be submitted to arbitration . . . , provided the Party or Parties
and Signatory or Signatories involved agree to such arbitration.
b) All legal disputes . .. between a Party and a State which has ceased to be a
Party .. . shall be submitted to arbitration .. ..· provided the State which has
ceaRed to be a Party so agrees.
55. Id.
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programs. The result, under Article XVIII, is that the non-Member is
barred from submitting the dispute to Intelsat for arbitration. The reasons for that result are: (1) even though the broadcasting country is a
Party, the dispute does not derive from any contractual obligations
between the Party and the non-Member, (2) the dispute is not between
Parties because the non-Member is not one, 56 (3) it is not between a
Party and a Signatory, 57 or betwee~ Signatories, and (4) it is not between a Party and a State that has ceased to be a Party. Therefore, there
is no relief to the non-Member receiving nation under Article XVIII.
Meanwhile, the broadcasting Party nation has been allowed to abuse
the direct broadcast satellite and to inflict serious damage on the receiving country.
The need for a non-Member receiving country to have access to
Intelsat's arbitration process is further magnified by the very nature of
the direct broadcast satellite. By employing such a satellite one avoids
the need to route television broadcasts through a ground receiving station in the country for which the programs are intended. Therefore any
control over program content that the receiving country would exercise
through its control of its earth station, would be dissipated by another
country's use of a direct broadcast satellite.
The foregoing illustrates the need on the part of non-Member receiving countries for access to the Intelsat arbitration system as well as
the unresponsiveness of Intelsat to that need.
2.

THE U.S.S.R. DRAFT CONVENTION 58

In contrast to the inadequacy of the Intelsat agreements in dealing
with the issues raised by the abuse of direct broadcast satellites, 59 the
U.S.S.R. Draft Convention speaks directly to those issues. The U.S.S.R.
Draft Convention specifically prohibits the broadcasting of materials
which are "immoral or instigating in nature or otherwise aimed at interfering in the domestic affairs or foreign policy of other States. " 60 It also
provides that "States Party to [the] Convention may carry out direct
television broadcasting by means of artificial earth satellites to foreign
States only with the express consent of the latter." 61 Any transmission
56. Id. art. I, para. (f).
f) "Party" means a State for which the Agreement has entered into force or been
provisionally applied.
57. Id. para . (g).
g) "Signatory" means a Party, or the telecommunication entity designated by
a Party, which has signed the Operating Agreement .
58. See U.S.S.R., supra note 9.
59. Supra page 106.
60 . See U.S.S.R., supra note 9, at 1378, art. IV.
61. Id ., art. V.
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of television programs without the express consent of the receiving state
would be regarded as illegal. The Draft Convention itself contains a list
of types of programs that would be treated as illegal. 62
As to any provisions regarding the settlement of potential disputes,
the Draft Convention offers a rather simple but startling solution.
Any State Party to [the] Convention may employ the means at its
disposal to counteract illegal television broadcasting of which it is the
object not only in its own territory but also in outer space and other
areas beyond the limits of the national jurisdiction of any State. 83

What Article IX amounts to is a blank check approval of the use of any
means available from mere jamming of signals to actual destruction of
the satellite. Combined with the Draft Convention's list of illegal broadcasts, the potential for international conflict over the use of direct
broadcast satellites becomes very pronounced. 64 This result is precisely
what is sought to be avoided by the development of an international set
of principles to govern direct broadcast satellites.
3.

THE UNESCO DECLARATION 65

The UNESCO Draft Declaration, like the U.S:S.R. Draft Convention, also addresses the issues raised by abuse of direct broadcast satellites. The Declaration specifically provides that satellite broadcasting
shall "respect the sovereignty of and the equality of all States, and shall
be conducted with due regard for the rights of individual persons
66
•••• "
It also requires that account be taken of the needs and rights
of audiences, 67 that each country have the right to decide on the content
of the programs broadcast by satellite to its people, 611 and that any
H2. Id. at 1:n9, art.. VI, para. (2)a-f.
a) Broadcasts detrimental to the maintenance of international peace and security.
h) Broadcasts representing interference in intra State conflicts of any kind.
c) Broadcasts involving an encroachment on fundamental human rights, on the
dignity and worth of the human person and on fundamental freedom for all
without distinct.ions as to race, sex, language or religion.
d) Broadcasts propagandizing violence, horrors, pornography and the use of
narcotics.
e) Broadcasts undermining the foundations of the local civilization, culture, way
of life, tradition or language.
f) Broadcasts which mis-inform the public on these or other matters.
();!. Id. at 1:l79, art.. IX, para. (1).
64 . The net effect of the U.S.S.R. proposal would appear to be not a lessening of
conflicts resulting from abuse of the direct broadcasting satellite, but rather a lessening
of operational telecommunication satellites .
6G. Se<' UN ]<;,'-,'CO, supra note 8.
66. Id. at 1477, art. II, paras. (1), (2).
67. Id. at 1478, art.. IV, para. (2) .
68. Id., art. VI, para. (2) .
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cultural programs should respect the distinctive character, value and
dignity of each country. 69 However, unlike the U.S.S.R. Draft Convention, the UNESCO Declaration does not provide for the use of jamming
or satellite destruction as a means of ending transmissions which violate
the principles set forth in the Declaration. As a matter of fact, the
UNESCO Declaration does not contain any provisions regarding the
settlement of disputes. 70
Reviewing the responsiveness of the proposals to the issues presented, there are (1) the Intelsat agreements, which contain no provisions speaking directly to the abuse of direct broadcast satellites and
which contain a dispute settlement provision that is inadequate to deal
with direct broadcast satellites; (2) the U.S.S.R. Draft Convention,
which specifically lists programs considered to be illegal when broadcast
over a direct broadcast satellite, and which also provides for destruction
of the offensive satellite by the receiving country at its own discretion;
and (3) the UNESCO proposal, which speaks peripherally to the issues
raised by abuse of the direct broadcast satellite but contains no specific
provisions relating to the settlement of disputes.
The end result is that the highly volatile issues of broadcast intervention, cultural imperialism, and propaganda still remain unresolved
at a point where the use of the direct broadcast satellite is imminent.

Access to the Telecommunication Satellite System
The issue of access is composed of two sub-issues: frequency allocation and orbital slot allocation.

B.

1.

FREQUENCY ALLOCATION

Neither the Intelsat agreements, the UNESCO proposal, nor the
U.S.S.R. Draft Convention attempt to obtain authority for determining
what bands of the radio frequency spectrum will be used for direct
broadcast satellites. This lack of concern with such an important and
essential area indicates that there is agreement that the I.T.U. 71 should
continue to exercise authority over the allocation of radio frequencies for
particular uses.
Even though most nations of the world are members of the l.T.U.,
69. Id., art. VII, para. (2) .
70. One could infer from the lack of any dispute settlement provision, that the various
States would have to work out their own solution. This result could lead to the adoption
of methods ranging from jamming to satellite destruction: precisely the methods encompassed in the U.S.S.R. Draft Convention .
71. S ee International Telecommunications Convention, May 29, 1967, [1967J 18
U.S.T. 575, T.I.A.S . No. 6267.
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violations of frequency assignments are numerous. 72 An attempt was
made, at the 1965 Montreux Convention, to strengthen the authoritative
and legislative powers of the I. T. U. by providing for an Optional Protocol on Compulsory Settlement of Disputes. 73 However, both the United
States and Russia withheld approval and as a result are governed by the
rather permissive dispute settlement provisions of Article 28 of the
I.T.U. Convention. 74 This refusal to submit to compulsory arbitration
poses an unneeded additional barrier to the furtherance of international
cooperation in the field of direct broadcast satellites.
Another problem in the field of frequency allocation is the actual
allocation procedures used by the I.T.U. 75 Those procedures generate
the potential for a monopoly of telecommunication frequences by a few
countries. The countries referred to are the technically advanced countries that will soon preempt all of the frequencies that have been allocated to space telecommunications purposes. 76 Therefore, unless a set of
international principles as to the use of these frequencies by direct
broadcast satellites is developed, the few countries possessing such satellites shall have an unrestrained monopoly over telecommunications.
2.

ORBITAL SLOT ALLOCATION

The issue of orbital slot allocation raises a problem because there
is a practical limit to the number of direct broadcast satellites that can
be placed in orbit without interfering with one another. This could enable one nation to deprive another of an entire area of broadcast coverage
by merely placing three direct broadcast satellites in a preferred position
over the equator. 77 The results of such action would be a monopoly over
7'2. ,Se<' S. LAY & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 11, at 114. Also note that among the
Member nations are the United States and the U.S .S.R.
?:{. Id. at I In n.5.
74 . Article '28 of the I.T.U . Convention provides for diplomatic negotiations or, in the
case of any existing agreements between disputants or failure to resolve the question, for
arbitration under Annex C. The provisions of Annex C are couched in very permissive
terms. Sc•<• S. LAY & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 11.
Also note t.hat the unwillingness of both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to approve the compulsory arhitrat.ion agreement seems to indicate that both nations are afraid of losing in
a dispute over a claim of right over a frequency.
7fJ. See note I2 supra and accompanying text.
7(). In the field of direct broadcast satellites there are very few countries with the
financial and technical capacities to build and launch such satellites. Under the l.T.U.
procedures a nation may not assign frequencies within an allocated band until it has the
capacity to use t.hat frequency. Therefore, the more advanced countries will soon be found
to have assigned most of the allocated frequencies.
77 . There are three orbital slots per frequency per synchronous orbit. Direct broadcast. satellites operate on U.H.F. frequency in the range of 750-900 MHz. With an average
hand width of 6 MH 2 per frequency there would be only 25 usable frequencies for a direct
broadcast. satellite. With a limit of three slots per frequency in order to avoid interference
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coverage of a particular area by one nation. Once such a monopoly had
been achieved, all other broadcasting countries would be forced to accept the monopolizing country's terms if they wanted access to its satellite system and its area of coverage. In addition, any of the receiving
countries within the monopolizing country's area ofcoverage would have
their program content determined solely by the monopolizing country.
Therefore, there is a genuine need for an international system or
code under which all nations desiring access to a direct broadcast satellite system could attain such access once all the orbital slots had been
filled.
3.

INTELSAT

The problem of access to the direct broadcast satellite system has
been dealt with in the new Intelsat agreements. An initial acknowledgement of the problem is contained in the preamble to the Definitive
Agreement where it states "satellite communications should be organized in such a way as to permit all people to have access to the global
satellite system . . . . " 78 In an effort to attain that goal, Intelsat has
been organized into three main bodies that together control access to
and utilization of the Intelsat satellite system. 79 The voting procedures
used at all three levels are, a two-thirds majority of the present voting
members 80 with voting participation at both the Signatory and Board of
Governors levels determined by investment percentage. 81 The Board of
Governors, however, restricts any one Governor from exercising more
than forty percent of the Board's total voting power. 82
The responsiveness of the Board of Governor's weighted voting procedures, to the goal of easy access to the direct broadcast satellite systhere is a maximum of only 75 orbital slots available to direct broadcast satellites. See
Gold, supra note 2, at 82.
78. See Intelsat, supra note 7.
79. The three groups are the Assembly of Parties, the Meeting of Signatories, and the
Board of Governors. See notes 37 & 38 supra.
80. See Intelsat, supra note 7, art. VII, para. (f).
f) Decisions on matters of substance (in the Assembly of Parties) shall be
taken by an affirmative vote cast by at least two-thirds of the Parties whose
representatives are present and voting.
Article VIII, para. (b)(e) stated:
Each signatory shall have one vote. Decisions on matters of substance shall be
taken by an affirmative vote cast by at least two-thirds of the Signatories .
present and voting.
Article IX, para. (j)(i) states:
!The Board of Governors! on all substantive questions . . . at least two-thirds
of the total voting participation of all Signatories represented on the Board of
Governors . . . .
81. See note 40 supra.
82. See note 43 supra.
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tern, has been criticized as being "incompatible with the principles of
sovereign equality ." 83 The most frequent proponents of this argument
are the U.S.S.R. and the Latin American countries which are members
oflntelsat. 84 Despite the validity of the principle behind the agreement,
it would be rather unrealistic to suppose that governments would invest
in such a system in varying proportions and then not expect to receive
voting participation equivalent to their investment. It has been noted
by other authors th~t the implementation of any plan which did not
consider the financial investment of countries would result in the development of competing systems and thus run counter to the concept of a
single international system. 85 The end result of abandoning a weighted
voting procedure would be even more barriers to international cooperation than exist at the present. Therefore, the present weighted voting
system would appear to be the most practical solution in light of the
substantial funding needed to operate an international satellite system
composed of direct broadcast satellites.
The second and more controversial area is that of the two-thirds
requirement in the Assembly of Parties by which use of the Intelsat
satellites is determined. Under the present system an applicant country
would be denied the use of any of Intelsat's direct broadcast satellites
unless a two-thirds majority of the present and voting Members favored
such use. Most likely, the nations present and voting .would be those in
the particular region into which the applicant country wished to broadcast. Therefore, if more than one-third of the countries in that region
objected to the applicant's use of the direct broadcast satellite, that
minority block of countries would prevent the rest of the region from
receiving a program it may desire. This result would seem to run counter
to the 1948 U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states:
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression, this right
includes freedom to hold opinion without interference and to seek,
receive, and import information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers. 86
8:1. S ee Smith, supra note 1.
84. Apart from the political factors which motivate Soviet criticism of the Western
controlled Intelsat, it is unlikely that the Communist nations could gain control of the
Board of Governors. This is because the Soviet usage of the Intelsat system would probably not be great enough to give it a voting percentage that would amount to veto power
on the Board of Governors . It is highly unlikely that the U.S.S.R. would be content with
only membership on the Board devoid of a veto. See Smith supra note 1, at 353. The
arguments raised by the Latin American countries are also based primarily on a desire
for greater control at the Signatory and Board levels.
85. Id. at 352.
86. G.A. Res . 217, art. 19, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 74-5 (1948).
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Even so, the result is partially justified on the grounds that many countries in the region, which border on the country for whom the program
was intended, would be subject to spill-over117 from the direct broadcast
satellite. Until the state of the art is further developed, direct broadcast
satellites will not possess pin-point accuracy, and spill-over will be a
problem that must be dealt with due to the high abuse potential of
direct broadcast satellites.
The alternative solutions to the two-thirds majority requirement
are either unanimous consent or one-vote veto power. Both of those
solutions possess abuse and conflict potential much more serious than
the present two-thirds vote requirement.
There will, however, remain the additional argument that the twothirds requirement will foster charges of conspiracies among some countries of a region to prevent reception of programs by other countries
within that region. Unfortunately, that problem will never be solved
regardless of what voting system is adopted. Therefore, in light of the
obvious abuses of a unanimity requirement or a one vote system, the
present two-thirds requirement remains the lesser of the evils suggested.
4. THE UNESCO DECLARATION

AND

THE U.S.S.R. DRAIT CONVENTION

Both the UNESCO Declaration and the U.S.S.R. Draft Convention
contain provisions that are relevant to the determination of the issue of
access to the direct broadcast satellite. The UNESCO Declaration
states that the benefits of satellite broadcasting should be available to
all countries without discrimination and should be based upon international cooperation, world-wide and regional. 1111 Similarly, the U.S.S.R.
Draft Convention calls for all States to have an equal right to carry out
direct television broadcasting without discrimination of any kind. 119
However, unlike the Intelsat agreements, there are no further provisions
regarding how such access is to be achieved. The results, therefore, are
that the Intelsat agreements, the UNESCO Declaration, and the
U.S.S.R. Draft Convention all recognize the need for world-wide access
to a direct broadcast satellite system. But, only Intelsat has made provisions that at least respond to the problem of implementing world-wide
access to the direct broadcast satellite.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

Technically speaking, a single world-wide system would provide the
87. The heam transmitted from a direct broadcast satellite has a basically cylindrical
shape with a very gradual fall off from the central point of maximum strength. Thus in
order to achieve truly national coverage the beam will of necessity spill into parts of
neighhoring countries that stand within the circular field. See Gold, supra note 2, at 80.
88. See UNESCO, .<;upra note 8, at 1477, art. III, para. (1) & (2).
89. See U.S.S.R., .<;Upra note 9, at 1378, art. I, para. (1) & (2).
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most effective use and management of the limited frequency spectrum.
It would avoid duplication of and interference with competing systems,
improve operating efficiency, and reduce the technical and operating
problems of compatibility between different space systems and other
services. uo Economically speaking, there are strong inducements to the
formation of a single telecommunications system. The most obvious
of these is that the more nations that cooperate with one another, the
less cost there will be per nation for the benefits of such a system.
However, despite the technical and economic arguments, and despite
the progress of the I. T. U. 91 and Intelsat92 in the area of international
cooperation, very little real progress has been made toward the goal of
establishing an international code of conduct as to the use of direct
broadcast satellites.
In addition to the difficulties of formulating a workable international code as to the use of and access to the direct broadcast satellite,
there are also the added efforts of the U.S.S.R., 93 Canada and Europe94
to develop separate telecommunications systems. With the limited
number of preferred orbital slots and allocated frequencies, 95 the
potential for conflict among the competing systems is very high.
The suggested solution to this state of affairs is to convene an international conference for the purposes of: (a) discussing the feasibility of
a single internatiop.al telecommunication system, (b) developing an international code of conduct as to the use of direct broadcast satellites,
and (c) developing a uniform system of access to such a satellite system
in order to ensure world-wide access. Present at such a conference would
be three main groups: the Intelsat countries, 96 Europe, 97 and the countries involved in the U.S.S.R. satellite system. 98 The Intelsat countries
can be further divided into the lesser developed countries, such as Latin
America and India, and the more developed countries, such as the
United States, Canada, and France. Even though the United States has
voted against the establishment of an international code of conduct in
the past, 99 there is no reason to believe that it would not attend a confer90. S ee Smith, supra note 1, at 350.
91. See notes 10-16, supra and accompanying text.
92 . See notes :30-43 supra and accompanying text.
93 . See note 44 supra.
94. See note 45 supra .
%. See note 79 supra and accompanying text.
96. See note 7 supra.
97 . In reference to Europe, there are some countries such as France, Italy, Federal
Republic of Germany, and Spain that are members of Intelsat and at the same time
involved in European efforts to establish regional telecommunication systems. Supra note
42.
98. See note 44 supra.
99. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.

Published by SURFACE, 1974

17

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 2, No. 1 [1974], Art. 7

116

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 2:99

ence called for the purpose of discussing a single international telecommunication system. mo
The concept of establishing a single international telecommunication system is an unrealistic one. Nations will, for reasons of security
or national prestige or politics, be concerned about a single world-wide
system over which they would have little control and which might be
under the control of an unsympathetic country. Among such nations are
France, Canada, the Soviet Union and oddly enough the United
States. rn• The most persistent barrier to a single world-wide system is
the refusal of the Soviet Union to cooperate with Intelsat. The political
and propaganda factors involved are of such an intensity that Communist participation in any form of Western-dominated system is highly
unlikely. rn 2
Perhaps the concept of a single global system could be realized,
however, if one interpreted single to mean a number of interconnected
regional systems woven into a single global system. 103 This solution
100. The United States has always favored a single system, and in fact the U.S. had
suggested the addition of a paragraph to Article I of the Intelsat Agreement that would
have explicitly bound the signatories to a single system and would have pledged them not
to participate in any other program. This paragraph was not included though, and the
efforts of the Canadians, .Japanese, Germans and French to develop satellite capabilities
indicate that the universal principle will be fragmented. See Smith, supra note 1, at 344.
IOI. Concern for security, absolute control, and possibly costs contributed strongly
to the establishment of a U.S. Department of Defense Communication Satellite System.
Political chauvinism plus distrust of the political potential of Intelsat doubtless were
major factors in the decision of the Soviets not to join Intelsat. France has indicated its
intent to establish its own system for primarily political and prestige reasons. Canada's
discussion of a separate system for domestic purposes was openly motivated by political
desires to avoid losing control of its domestic communication system to the United States
or Intelsat. See S . LAY & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 11, at 112 n.49.
102. It has been suggested though, that the Soviets may hope to bargain for a disproportionate voice on Intelsat by their development of a successfully competitive satellite
system of their own. See S . LAY & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 11, at 125.
In the related area of earth resource satellites, there has been a significant shift in
the Soviet attitude toward international control of the collection and distribution of data
from such satellites. Earth resource satellites are used for scanning the earth with highly
sensitive cameras and sensors for location of valuable natural resources. The Soviet Union
has proposed that the United Nations establish a center for the collection and distribution
of data obtained from such satellites. Until now, the Soviets have been unwilling to have
any international authority involved. N .Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1974, at 20, col. 3.
This recent shift in attitude could be an indicator of a possible willingness to allow a
non-Western dominated international agency, under the auspices of the U.N., to have
authority over an international telecommunication satellite system. It has already been
noted that the U.S.S.R. supports an international convention on the use of direct broadcast satellites as evidenced by its proposed Draft Convention. See notes 62 & 63 supra and
accompanying text.
Im. This theory has been criticized as being naive in that it disregards the political
realities of the situation. See Smith, supra note 14, at 351.
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would seem to be the most practical in light of the present development
of a number of telecommunications satellites. Through such a system
each region would be able to retain some control over its own area, while
at the same time benefiting from the use of other regional systems. Such
a system would be ideal for direct broadcast satellites, which are limited
as to the number which may be orbited. 104
Provided such a "single international telecommunications system"
could be achieved, there would still remain the problem of the lack of
an internationally accepted code of conduct as to use of any direct
broadcast satellites within the system. Without such a code, each
regional system would be operating under its own standards. The
results would be international conflict and abuse of the direct broadcast
satellites under the control of a region. 105 Such a result would defeat the
purpose of a regionally interconnected system.
The second issue to be dealt with at the Conference would be the
development of an international code of conduct as to the use of direct
broadcast satellites. Opposition to the development of such a code
would be minimal. As previously noted, a U .N. General Assembly resolution calling for a convention to deal with this issue, was almost unanimously adopted. 106 As early as 1963, during the discussions of the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, the Latin American countries expressed their view that there should be some reference to international
scrutiny of a global satellite system. 107 With the rapid development and
imminent use of the direct broadcast satellite, there are presently more
reasons to support such international scrutiny than in 1963. \It has
already been noted that the U.S.S.R. favors the formationiof an
international code of conduct. 108 The only possible opposition to the
development of an international code of conduct would be that of the
United States. As previously mentioned, the United States was the only
country in the General Assembly that voted against the resolution call104 . See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
105. A good example would be if the United States, through Intelsat, was using a
direct broadcast satellite to beam propaganda into a Soviet country without its approval.
The Soviet country would probably be operating under the U.S .S.R. Draft Convention
principles. Instead of using .diplomatic channels, the receiving country, under Article IX
(supra note
would proceed to shoot the satellite out of the sky. This is precisely the
sort of situation sought to be avoided through the use of inter-connected regional systems.
!Of}. See note 27 supra and accompanying text .
107. Brazil, in particular, wanted a ban on the utilization of a communication system
based on satellites for purposes of encouraging national racial or class rivalries. See W.
•h-:NKS, SPACF. LAW 261 (1965) [hereinafter cited as W. JENKS[.
108. See note 62 supra and accompanying text. Also note that as early as 1963, the
U.S.S.R. was demanding a prohibition on the use of outer space for propagating war,
nation al hatred or enmity between nations. See note 107 supra.

mn
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ing for the development of such a code. 109 The suggested reason for such
opposition was the heavy United States financial committment to Intelsat and the fear that such a code would conflict with the Intelsat agreements.110 However, the Intelsat agreements contain ample references to
the adoption of rules to regulate the use of the Intelsat satellite system.111 Therefore, in light of the world-wide recognition of the need for
regulation of satellite communications and the high abuse potential of
the direct broadcast satellite, it may be posited that it would be in the
best interests of the United States to support the development of an
international code.
It is suggested that such an international code be modelled after the
UNESCO and U.S.S.R. proposals, 112 except that Article IX of the Soviet
Draft Convention be omitted. 113 In its place should be adopted an arbitration system similar to that of Intelsat's, 114 but with the addition of a
provision that would permit a country that was a non-Member of any
regional system access to the arbitration process of the offending region.
As for inter-region arbitration, the only effective method would be to
have an independent arbitration tribunal made up of representatives
from each Member region in the telecommunication system. Only in
that way would impartial settlements be achieved in an inter-region
dispute. The main obstacle to be overcome in adopting such an arbitration system would be that of an unwillingness on the part of nations to
vest an independent body with authority that would impinge on national sovereignty. If a truly workable global telecommunication system
is to be achieved, such obstacles must be overcome.
The third issue to be dealt with at such a conference would be that
of developing a uniform system of access to a direct broadcast satellite
system. Without such access based upon nondiscriminatory methods,
the technologically advanced and financially capable countries will obtain a monopoly over the use of direct broadcast satellites. 115 The result
would be that the lesser developed countries would be denied a voice in
determining the actual use of the direct broadcast satellite system.
There is agreement among most nations of the world, as evidenced by
the Intelsat agreements, UNESCO Draft Declaration, and the U.S.S.R.
109 . See note 27 supra and accompanying text. Also note that during the 1963 discussions on the Declaration of Legal Principles, the United States voted against the inclusion
of any express declaration prohibiting the use of outer space for propaganda. See W .
•JF.NKR, supra note 107 .
110. See note 7 supra.
111. See notes :16, 37, 50 & 53 supra and accompanying text.
112. See notes 8 & 9 supra respectively.
l l:l. See note 6:-3 supra and accompanying text.
114. See note S4 supra and accompanying text.
115. See note 76 supra.
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Draft Convention that the benefits of direct broadcast satellites should
be available to all countries. 116 The only )source of disagreement is the
manner in which such world-wide access is to be achieved.
Intelsat's weighted voting procedures at the Board of Governors
level, minimum investment requirements for participation at the Signatory level, and two-thirds requirement for approval of access to its facilities117 have been sharply criticized. However, most of this criticism has
been centered in the countries without a large financial stake in Intelsat,
and from the U.S.S.R. 118 The lesser developed nations with low investment in Intelsat will strive for a one-vote/one-nation procedure to be
used in determining access to any telecommunication system. Such a
system would be unrealistic in the light of the considerable funds needed
to operate a telecommunication system. 119 It is suggested therefore that
some form of weighted voting, according to investment, will be inevitable in any regional system that is developed.
As to the two-thirds requirement that Intelsat uses to determine
access to and use of their satellite system, until direct broadcasting is
capable of greater accuracy and the problems of spill-over have disappeared, some form of majority consent within a region will be needed.
As noted earlier a two-thirds requirement carries less abuse potential
than the alternatives of either unanimous consent or one vote veto
power. 120 Therefore it is suggested that a two-thirds requirement similar
to that of Intelsat's be adopted as an international standard. This will
not be an easy task to accomplish because each nation will have its own
idea as to what voting system will be the most equitable, and each
nation will strive for whatever voting system will give it the most leverage.
There is, therefore, no assurance that the nations of the world will
agree oh every issue presented at the suggested conference. However,
unless immediate steps are taken to achieve international agreement
and cooperation, as to the use of and access to direct broadcast satellites, the world will run the risk of allowing the great benefits to be
derived from such satellites to be lost in the flurry of conflicts that will
be generated in the absence of effective international regulatory standards.
Gary C. Merckel
116.
117 .
118.
119.
120.

See notes 7, 88 & 89 supra and accompanying text.
See note 80 supra.
See notes 83 & 84 supra and accompanying text.
See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
Supra page 113.
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